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SYMPOSIUM
GENDER EQUALITY AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
FOREWORD
Jeanmarie Fenrich,* Benjamin C. Zipursky**
& Danielle Keats Citron***
Gender equality demands equal opportunity to speak and be heard. Yet,
in recent years, the clash between equality and free speech in the context of
gender has intensified—in the media, the workplace, college campuses, and
the political arena, both online and offline. The internet has given rise to
novel First Amendment issues that particularly affect women, such as
nonconsensual pornography, online harassment, and online privacy. On
November 1–2, 2018, the Fordham Law Review brought together scholars
and practicing lawyers from around the nation to address many of the
pressing challenges facing feminists and free speech advocates today. The
Symposium was a fitting topic to mark the occasion of 100 years of women
at Fordham Law School.
Over twenty scholars, practitioners, and writers participated in the two-day
conference, along with Sylvia A. Law, Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of
Law, Medicine, and Psychiatry Emerita of N.Y.U. School of Law, who
delivered the Robert L. Levine Lecture.1 Conference panels considered
campus speech issues, including trigger warnings, safe spaces, and hostile
classrooms; pornography, including nonconsensual pornography (or
“revenge porn”); being female online and how the internet affects women’s
reputations, self-expression, and privacy; words, images, misogyny, and the
First Amendment; and how gender representation in the media and politics
impact political outcomes and reproductive rights.

* Director of Special Projects, Leitner Center for International Law and Justice, Fordham
University School of Law.
** James H. Quinn ’49 Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham University School of Law.
*** Morton & Sophia Macht Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law.
1. Sylvia A. Law, Income Disparity, Gender Equality, and Free Expression, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 2479 (2019).
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This issue of the Fordham Law Review includes papers from six of the
Symposium participants,2 in addition to Professor Law’s Levine Lecture.3
In “When Law Frees Us to Speak,” Professors Danielle Keats Citron and
Jonathon W. Penney argue that “law has a crucial expressive function in
combating online abuse.”4 Women and marginalized groups often retreat
from online engagement in the face of cyberharassment and invasions of their
sexual privacy.5 This Article presents original empirical research showing
law’s salutary effects on women’s online expression.6 It also focuses on
another dimension of cyberharassment law: its ability to empower victims
to speak.7
In “American Courts and the Sex Blind Spot: Legitimacy and
Representation,” Professor Michele Goodwin and Mariah Lindsay start with
the “enduring problem of women’s marginal inclusion in government”8 and
the resulting policies, legislation, and judicial opinions that perpetuate sex
inequality and harm women’s interests.9 Professor Goodwin and Ms.
Lindsay go on to consider the problem of homogeneity in the judiciary
generally and women’s underrepresentation in the judiciary in particular.10
They are particularly interested in the voting patterns of women judges
appointed by Republican presidents, and they conducted a two-year
empirical study examining the voting records of federal circuit judges in
abortion cases to determine whether women judges are more likely to protect
reproductive health rights than their male colleagues.11 The study found that
women judges appointed by conservative presidents were more committed
to and protective of women’s autonomy and reproductive rights than their
male counterparts, demonstrating the significance of having adequate
representation of women judges to promote sex equality and to protect
reproductive rights.12
Professor Linda C. McClain considers whether the First Amendment, as
judicially interpreted, has been a roadblock to gender equality in “‘“Male
Chauvinism” Is Under Attack from All Sides at Present’: Roberts v. United
2. Danielle Keats Citron & Jonathon W. Penney, When Law Frees Us to Speak, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 2317 (2019); Michele Goodwin & Mariah Lindsay, American Courts and
the Sex Blind Spot: Legitimacy and Representation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2337 (2019); Linda
C. McClain, “‘Male Chauvinism’ Is Under Attack from All Sides at Present”: Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, Sex Discrimination, and the First Amendment, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
2385 (2019); Helen Norton, Pregnancy and the First Amendment, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2417
(2019); Lynne Tirrell, Toxic Misogyny and the Limits of Counterspeech, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
2433 (2019); Keith E. Whittington, Free Speech and the Diverse University, 87 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2453 (2019).
3. Law, supra note 1.
4. Citron & Penney, supra note 2, at 2320.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 2331–33.
7. See id. at 2327.
8. Goodwin & Lindsay, supra note 2, at 2342.
9. Id. at 2341–44.
10. See generally id.
11. See id. at 2372.
12. See id. at 2373.
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States Jaycees, Sex Discrimination, and the First Amendment.”13 In
particular, Professor McClain is interested in the freedom of association
protection afforded by the First Amendment as articulated in Roberts v.
United States Jaycees14 and its complicated relationship to ensuring equal
citizenship and gender equality for women.15
Professor Helen Norton also addresses reproductive rights in relation to
speech in “Pregnancy and the First Amendment.”16 In particular, her Essay
considers First Amendment jurisprudence with respect to reproductive health
Professor Norton reviews U.S. Supreme Court
care providers.17
jurisprudence in this area and concludes that existing law ignores pregnant
women’s First Amendment interests as listeners who would benefit from
receiving information relevant to their health-care choices.18 She argues that
the First Amendment requires the government to identify itself as the source
when it speaks to pregnant women about their reproductive-health options.
Relatedly, Professor Norton contends, the First Amendment allows the
government to ensure that health-care providers give accurate and relevant
information to pregnant women about reproductive-health decisions.19
Several papers tackle the complications of regulating speech that causes
harm. In “Toxic Misogyny and the Limits of Counterspeech,” Professor
Lynne Tirrell considers the harms inflicted by misogynist speech and the
limits of counterspeech as a remedy, especially for vulnerable targets.20
Professor Tirrell addresses the systemic enforcement of patriarchal power
and subordination of women through words, images, and actions and argues
for using the law, and language norms more broadly, to challenge speech and
images that cause harm to women.21
In “Free Speech and the Diverse University,” Professor Keith E.
Whittington challenges the claim that free speech and inclusivity should be
regarded as conflicting values on campus.22 Rather, Professor Whittington
maintains that both values are essential to advancing human knowledge and
the free exchange of ideas.23 He argues that universities should examine the
central commitments of their institutions and how these relate to freedom of
speech in order to adopt a statement of principles (as the University of
13. McClain, supra note 2.
14. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
15. McClain, supra note 2, at 2388–89.
16. Norton, supra note 2.
17. See generally id.
18. See id. at 2431 (“What would the First Amendment law that applies to speech to
pregnant women look like if we considered the First Amendment interests of pregnant
women?”).
19. See id. at 2430–31.
20. Tirrell, supra note 2, at 2435 (“Counterspeech has limited power and reach, and often
the most vulnerable targets of nasty speech are not in a position to reply with ‘more speech.’”).
21. See id. at 2451–52.
22. Whittington, supra note 2, at 2453 (“Much of the debate surrounding campus free
speech in recent years has assumed that choices must be made between speech and inclusivity
and has moved on to argue over which should take priority. It is a mistake to set these two
values in conflict with one another.”).
23. See id. at 2454.
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Chicago did in 2014).24 Such a process would build consensus within the
community and allow universities to ensure that their own policies and
culture promote these agreed-upon values.25 Professor Whittington also
addresses the insufficiency of simply adopting a statement and discusses the
importance of institutionalizing a culture of intellectual freedom that would
allow students to understand how and why they should engage with
challenging ideas.26
In addition to the authors listed above, we would also like to thank the
many other scholars and practitioners who presented at the Symposium:
Amy Adler, Anita Allen, Corey Brettschneider, Susan Brison, Susan
Buckley, Elisa D’Amico, Mary Anne Franks, Carrie Goldberg, Virginia
Heffernan, Kate Klonick, Suzanne Nossel, Virginia Ryan, Nadine Strossen,
and Nabiha Syed.
This final issue of Volume 87 of the Fordham Law Review honors the
hundredth anniversary of Fordham Law School opening its doors to women
by showcasing the varied and vibrant scholarship of Fordham women. This
Symposium is published alongside an Article by Fordham Law professor
Aditi Bagchi, which proposes that manufacturers of consumer goods should
be civilly liable for the conditions under which those goods are made;27 and
five student Notes,28 all written by women, on topics ranging from New York
City’s regulation of Airbnb29 to the federal taxation of cryptocurrency.30 It
is also accompanied by a Fordham Law Review Online Symposium
collecting scholarship by women Fordham Law professors and women
editors and alumnae of the Law Review.31

24. See id. at 2458–60.
25. See id. at 2460–61.
26. See id. at 2463–65.
27. Aditi Bagchi, Production Liability, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2019).
28. Claire Abrahamson, Note, Guilt by Genetic Association: The Fourth Amendment and
the Search of Private Genetic Databases by Law Enforcement, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2539
(2019); Tess Hofmann, Note, Airbnb in New York City: Whose Privacy Rights Are Threatened
by a Government Data Grab?, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2589 (2019); Daniela C. Manzi, Note,
Managing the Misinformation Marketplace: The First Amendment and the Fight Against
Fake News, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2623 (2019); Kathleen McCullough, Note, Mandatory
Arbitration and Sexual Harassment Claims: #MeToo- and Time’s Up-Inspired Action Against
the Federal Arbitration Act, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2653 (2019); Danhui Xu, Note, Free Money,
but Not Tax-Free: A Proposal for the Tax Treatment of Cryptocurrency Hard Forks, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 2693 (2019).
29. Hofmann, supra note 28.
30. Xu, supra note 28.
31. For an overview of the Online Symposium, see Elizabeth B. Cooper, 100 Years of
Women at Fordham: A Foreword and Reflection, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 39 (2019).

